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Spending to win : political institutions, economic geography, and government subsidies

Author: Stephanie J Rickard
Publisher: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2018. ©2018
Series: Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"Democratic institutions ostensibly serve the common good. Yet democratically elected leaders face varied incentives. Politicians must balance the public's welfare with demands from interest groups that run counter to the common good. Nowhere is this balancing act more apparent than in the area of economic policy. Many economic policies redistribute resources between groups. Governments collect taxes and  Read more...
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Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Stephanie J Rickard
ISBN: 9781108422321 1108422322
OCLC Number: 1035781158
Description: xi, 248 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Contents: Who gets what and why? The politics of particularistic economic policies --
The uneven geographic dispersion of economic activity --
How institutions and geography work together to shape policy --
Explaining government spending on industrial subsidies --
The power of producers : successful demands for state aid --
Why institutional differences among proportional representation systems matter --
The policy effects of electoral competitiveness in closed-list PR --
Conclusion and Implications.
Series Title: Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Other Titles: Political institutions, economic geography, and government subsidies
Responsibility: Stephanie J. Rickard.

Abstract:

Why do some democracies redistribute more than others? Election practices cause some governments to deliver policies, such as industrial subsidies, that assist small groups of citizens at the expense  Read more...

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'Spending to Win shows that the interplay of national economic structure and national electoral systems has a powerful impact on economic policy. In it, Stephanie J. Rickard analyzes how the Read more...

 
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