A theory of "Crying wolf" : the economics of money laundering enforcement (eBook, 2007) [WorldCat.org]
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A theory of "Crying wolf" : the economics of money laundering enforcement

Author: Elöd Takáts; International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Department.
Publisher: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2007.
Series: IMF working paper, WP/07/81.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
The paper shows how excessive reporting, called "crying wolf", can dilute the information value of reports. Excessive reporting is investigated by undertaking the first formal analysis of money laundering enforcement. Banks monitor transactions and report suspicious activity to government agencies, which use these reports to identify investigation targets. Banks face fines should they fail to report money  Read more...
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Details

Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Takáts, Elöd, 1975-
Theory of "Crying wolf".
[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2007
(OCoLC)180134103
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Elöd Takáts; International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Department.
ISBN: 128351138X 9781283511384 1451910983 9781451910988
OCLC Number: 648381747
Reproduction Notes: Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL
Description: 1 online resource (54 pages) : illustrations.
Details: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Series Title: IMF working paper, WP/07/81.
Responsibility: prepared by Eló̈d Takáts.

Abstract:

The paper shows how excessive reporting, called "crying wolf", can dilute the information value of reports. Excessive reporting is investigated by undertaking the first formal analysis of money laundering enforcement. Banks monitor transactions and report suspicious activity to government agencies, which use these reports to identify investigation targets. Banks face fines should they fail to report money laundering. However, excessive fines force banks to report transactions which are less suspicious. The empirical evidence is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. The model is used to suggest implementable corrective policy measures, such as decreasing fines and introducing reporting fees.

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