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Trust, Control, and the Economics of Governance.

Author: Philipp Herold
Publisher: Milton : Routledge, 2019. ©2019.
Series: Routledge Studies in Trust Research Ser.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version
Herold, Philipp
Trust, Control, and the Economics of Governance
Milton : Routledge,c2019
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Philipp Herold
ISBN: 9781000023206 1000023206
OCLC Number: 1105958820
Description: 1 online resource (222 pages).
Contents: Cover --
Half Title --
Series --
Title --
Copyright --
Dedication --
Contents --
1 Introduction --
1.1. The Problem of Governing Cooperation --
1.2. The Need for a Framework to Economize on Governance Devices --
1.3. Structure of the Book --
2 Understanding of Trustworthiness as an Intrinsic Institution --
2.1. Trust: Expected Trustworthy Behavior --
2.1.1. Encapsulated Interest as the Rational Choice Account of Trust --
2.1.2. The Leap of Faith Account and Trust Propensity --
2.1.3. Transaction Cost Economics and the Rationality of Trust --
2.1.4. Agency Theory, Asymmetric Agency and Entrusting --
2.2. Control: Non-Opportunism and Other Institutions --
2.2.1. Non-Opportunism as a Feature of Trustworthiness --
2.2.2. Non-Opportunism as an Intrinsic Institution --
2.2.3. Opportunism and Empirical Conditions of "Conventional" Institutions --
2.3. On the Interplay of Trust and Control --
2.3.1. Substitutes vs. Complements --
2.3.2. Negative Indirect Effects: Crowding Out --
2.3.3. Positive Indirect Effects: Crowding In --
2.3.4. Framing Determining Sign of Indirect Effect --
3 The Proposed Heuristic --
3.1. "Trust Control Economics" as a Theoretical Framework --
3.1.1. Theoretical Underpinnings and Choice of Host Discipline --
3.1.2. Revisiting the Assumption Set --
3.1.3. Trust Control Economics --
3.1.4. On the Distinction Between Extrinsic and Intrinsic Governance --
3.2. The "Extended Trust Sentence" as Pattern of Trust Relations --
3.2.1. Recognizing the Empirical Conditions of the Trustee --
3.2.2. Recognizing Control as an Element of Circumstances: "Trustworthiness Accretion" --
3.2.3. Social Capital, Enforcement Capital and Trustees Trading in Freedom --
3.2.4. The Negative Extended Trust Sentence --
3.3. The "Game of Trust and Control" as Application in Practice --
3.3.1. Introduction --
3.3.2. Building the Game. 3.3.3. Possible Formalization of Non-Opportunism --
3.3.4. On the Notion of Control --
4 Use-Test of the Game of Trust and Control --
4.1. Calibration of the Non-Opportunism Parameter in Practice --
4.2. Information Intermediaries --
4.2.1. General Aspects --
4.2.2. Information Intermediaries Within the Primary Game --
4.2.3. On Sources for Indirect Signals/Cues --
4.2.4. On the Information Intermediary as Executing Trustee --
4.2.5. Limits to Information Intermediaries --
4.3. Control Facilitator --
4.3.1. General Aspects --
4.3.2. Chain of Governance --
4.3.3. (Sub-)Delegation and Remoteness --
4.3.4. Limits of Control in Practice --
4.3.5. Self-Commitment --
4.4. Risk Bearer --
4.4.1. General Aspects --
4.4.2. On Sub-Delegation and Ultimate Liability --
4.4.3. Limits to Risk Bearers --
4.4.4. On the Inherent Tension of Trust Industries --
5 Conceptual Evaluation of the Heuristic --
5.1. Framework for Evaluation --
5.2. Rigor vs. Relevance: Linking Theory and Problem --
5.3. Abstraction vs. Re-Enrichment: Linking Theory and User --
5.3.1. On the Heuristic Priming and Framing Trust Decisions --
5.3.2. On the Heuristic Tapping Prior Knowledge --
5.4. (Re-)Cognition: Linking User and Problem --
5.4.1. On the Heuristic Addressing and Accommodating a Relevant Problem --
5.4.2. On the Reasoning Resource Requirements of the Heuristic --
6 Concluding Remarks --
6.1. Results for Practical Implementation --
6.1.1. Additions to the Understanding of Trust-Control Problems --
6.1.2. Additions to the Decision Making Toolbox --
6.2. Results Regarding the Conceptual Understanding --
6.2.1. From the Perspective of Trust Research --
6.2.2. From the Perspective of Economics --
Publication Bibliography --
Appendix: Game Theoretic Contributions to Formalizing Trust Problems --
Index.
Series Title: Routledge Studies in Trust Research Ser.

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