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Material Type: | Document, Government publication, National government publication, Internet resource |
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Document Type: | Internet Resource, Computer File |
All Authors / Contributors: |
John F Tierney; United States. Congress. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. |
OCLC Number: | 642929052 |
Notes: | Title from title screen (viewed June 22, 2010). "June 2010." |
Description: | 1 online resource (79 pages) : color illustrations, map |
Details: | Mode of access: World Wide Web.; System requirements: Adobe Reader. |
Contents: | I. Executive summary -- II. Background -- III. Findings. 1. Security for the U.S. supply chain Is principally provided by warlords -- 2. The highway warlords run a protection racket -- 3. Protection payments for safe passage are a significant potential source of funding for the Taliban -- 4. Unaccountable supply chain security contractors fuel corruption -- 5. Unaccountable supply chain security contractors undermine U.S. counterinsurgency strategy -- The Department of Defense lacks effective oversight of its supply chain and private security contractors in Afghanistan -- 7. HNT Contractors warned the Department of Defense about protection payments for safe passage to no avail -- IV. Recommendations. |
Other Titles: | Extortion and corruption along the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan |
Responsibility: | majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. |
Abstract:
After a six-month investigation, the report exposes the circumstances surrounding the Department of Defense's outsourcing of security on the supply chain in Afghanistan to questionable providers, including warlords. The findings of this report range from sobering to shocking. In short, the Department of Defense designed a contract that put responsibility for the security of vital U.S. supplies on contractors and their unaccountable security providers. This arrangement has fueled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others. Not only does the system run afoul of the Department's own rules and regulations mandated by Congress, it also appears to risk undermining the U.S. strategy for achieving its goals in Afghanistan. This report is confined to the facts pertaining to the Host Nation Trucking contracts, and in that limited sphere there are constructive changes that can be made to the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan to improve contracting integrity while mitigating corrupting influences. This report offers some realistic recommendations to serve as a catalyst for what appears to be a much-needed reconsideration of policy.
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