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What it is like to perceive : direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception

Author: J Christopher Maloney
Publisher: New York : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive.
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Maloney, J. Christopher.
What it is like to perceive.
New York : Oxford University Press, 2018
(DLC) 2018008998
(OCoLC)1027821159
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: J Christopher Maloney
ISBN: 9780190854768 0190854766 0190854782 9780190854782
OCLC Number: 1042074478
Description: 1 online resource.
Contents: Cover; What It Is Like to Perceive; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 What Is What It Is Like?; 2 Initial Assumptions; 3 Intentionalism and Higher Order Theory; 4 Advertisement of Direct Realism; 5 The Hypothesis of the Extended Mind; 6 Disjunctivism Denied; 1 Intentionalism and Recurrent Cognitive Content; 1 What Is What It Is Like?; 2 Qualitative versus Subjective Character; 3 The Forks of Intentionalism: Reductive and Not; 4 Intentionalism's Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual Content; 4.1 Tense and the Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual Content 4.2 The Rich Content Thesis and the Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual Content4.3 The Master Argument Bedeviling Intentionalism; 2 Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation; 1 The Cognitive Face of Experience; 2 Representations and Propositions; 3 Minimal and Maximal Intentionalism; 4 Intentionalism and Perceptual Attitudes; 5 Getting the Given from the Gotten; 5.1 The Supervenience of Character on Content; 5.2 The Identification of Phenomenal Character withPerceptual Content; 3 Intentionalism's Troubles Begin; 1 Intentionalism's Puzzling Exportation of PhenomenalCharacter 2 Two Questions for Intentionalism2.1 Coincident Perceptual Content but Divergent; 2.2 Perceptual Content; 3 Byrne's Argument for Minimal Intentionalism; 4 Objections to Byrne's Argument; 4.1 Recurrent Content and Attitude Proliferation; 4.2 Reasoning within Experience; 4 Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content; 1 Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content; 2 Plenitudinous versus Parsimonious Perceptual Content; 2.1 Attention and Smudge; 2.2 Mnemonic Amplification; 2.3 Memory Systems; 2.4 Idle Mnemonic Residue; 3 Fine- Grained Content 3.1 Concepts as Constituents of Mental Representations3.2 Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content; 3.3 Nonconceptual Content as Immature Conceptual Content; 3.4 Poised Perceptual Content; 4 Fineness of Grain Reconsidered; 4.1 Cognitively Penetrable Perception; 4.2 Cognitive Penetration and Cognitive Rehearsal; 5 Sperling on Perception and Memory; 5.1 Sperling's Hypothesis and Intentionalism; 5.2 Sperling's Hypothesis Rejected; 5.3 Mnemonic Preservation; 5.4 Phillips on Postdiction; 5.5 Reply to Phillips; 5 Higher Order Theory; 1 Representations Represented 1.1 Is Phenomenal Character Relational?1.2 Thinking about Perceiving; 2 Transparency and Higher Order Theory (HOT); 3 Unconscious Perception; 3.1 Unconscious or Forgotten Experience?; 3.2 Unsuffered Phenomenal Character; 3.3 On Behalf of Mnemonic Lapse; 4 Unconscious Phenomenal Character; 5 Rosenthal's Rendition of Higher Order Theory; 5.1 First Order versus Higher Order Mental Representations; 5.2 Overt versus Covert HOT Production; 5.3 The Attractions of Rosenthal's Higher Order Theory; 6 Objections to Higher Order Theory; 6.1 Goldman against Relationally Determined Phenomenal Character
Responsibility: J. Christopher Maloney, Professor of Philosophy and Member of Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona.

Abstract:

Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive  Read more...

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