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Genre/Form: | Electronic resource Electronic books Criticism, interpretation, etc |
---|---|
Named Person: | John Rawls; John Rawls |
Material Type: | Document, Internet resource |
Document Type: | Internet Resource, Computer File |
All Authors / Contributors: |
Paul J Weithman |
ISBN: | 9780195393033 0195393031 0199781214 9780199781218 9780199894901 0199894906 |
OCLC Number: | 729550897 |
Awards: | Winner of Winner of the 2012 David and Elaine Spitz Prize. |
Description: | 1 online resource |
Contents: | Cover13; -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of Tables -- Introduction -- 1: Overview -- 2: The Road to Come -- 3: A Deeper Understanding of Justice as Fairness? -- 4: Unity, Theodicy, and the Attractions of Liberalism -- 5: A Final Word to the Reader -- Chapter I: The Public Basis View -- I.1: Initial Statement of the Public Basis View -- I.2: The Pivotal Argument -- I.3: Imputing the Pivotal Argument? -- I.4: The Public Basis View Restated -- I.5: Difficulties with the Strong Version -- I.6: Difficulties with the Weak Version -- I.7: Conclusion -- Chapter II: Stability and Congruence -- II. 1: Stability, Inherent and Imposed -- II. 2: Matching the Right and the Good in Justice as Fairness -- II. 3: Congruence and Stability -- II. 4: Congruence and Inherent Stability -- Chapter III: Ideals and Inconsistency -- III. 1: An Inconsistency in Justice as Fairness? -- III. 2: Ideals and Comprehensive Conceptions -- III. 3: Endorsing on the Basis of Shared Ideals -- III. 4: Congruence and C[sub(3)] -- III. 5: C[sub(3)] and Inconsistency -- Chapter IV: The Acquisition of Four Desires -- IV. 1: Two Readings of the Aristotelian Principle -- IV. 2: The Acquisition of Four Desires -- IV. 3: Four Desires and Thin Reasons -- Chapter V: Thin Reasons to Be Just -- V.1: Setting up the Problem -- V.2: The Aristotelian Principle and the Argument for Congruence -- V.3: Four Thin Reasons -- V.4: Some Questions about the First Three Arguments -- V.5: Some Puzzles about the Fourth Argument -- Chapter VI: The Argument from Love and Justice -- VI. 1: Balances and Temptations -- VI. 2: Two Questions about Table II. 3 -- VI. 3: Conditional Balances and Balance Conditionals -- VI. 4: The Argument from Love and Justice -- VI. 5: Love8217;s Balance -- VI. 6: Four Comments on the Argument -- Chapter VII: Kantian Congruence and the Unified Self -- VII. 1: An Overview of the Kantian Congruence Argument -- VII. 2: The Argument from C[sub(4)]a -- VII. 3 From the Ostensible Conclusion to Congruence -- VII. 4: Establishing (5.5') -- VII. 5: Defending (5.2) -- VII. 6: Finality, Rationality, and the Unity of the Self -- VII. 7: Kantian Unity -- VII. 8: Korsgaard, Unity and the Bridge Function -- VII. 9: Is the OP Necessary? -- VIII. 10: Conclusion -- Chapter VIII: The Great Unraveling -- VIII. 1: The Content of Ideals -- VIII. 2: Defending C[sub(3)] -- VIII. 3: Pluralism and the Failure of Congruence -- VIII. 4: The Failure of Kantian Congruence -- VIII. 5: The Great Unraveling -- VIII. 6: Brief Contrasts with Other Accounts -- Chapter IX: The Political Ideals of Justice as Fairness -- IX. 1: PL8217;s Basic Argument for Stability -- IX. 2: C[sub(3)]' and the Sense of Justice -- IX. 3: C[sub(3)]' and the Ideals of Conduct -- IX. 4: C[sub(3)]' and the Social Ideals of Justice as Fairness -- IX. 5: Whither Congruence? -- Chapter X: Comprehensive Reasons to Be Just -- X.1: Moving from (9.2) and (9.3) to (9.5) -- X.2: Would there Be an Overlapping Consensus? -- X.3: Legitimacy and Justification -- X.4: Why Political Legitimacy? -- X.5: A Question about the Arguments for C[sub(9)] and C[sub(PL)] -- X.6: Public Reason, Mutual Assurance, and Pluralism about Justice -- X.7: Stability, Reflective Equilibrium, and Public Justification -- X.8: Conclusion -- Chapter XI: Conclusion -- XI. 1: The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism? -- XI. 2: A Conception-Based Vie. |
Series Title: | Oxford political philosophy. |
Responsibility: | Paul Weithman. |
Abstract:
Reviews
Publisher Synopsis
Paul Weithman has written what is undoubtedly the most patient, probing, and imaginative study we have of John Rawls' political liberalism. Explaining the reasons for the dramatic shift in Rawls' later thinking about the nature of justice and political society, Weithman also shows why this reorientation ought to engage the attention of anyone who cares about liberal ideals and the fate of democratic institutions. This book is not only an interpretive work of thefirst order. It also constitutes a distinctive theoretical achievement in its own right. * Charles Larmore, Brown University * not only a convincing rebuttal of the standard story ... but more importantly, a detailed reconstruction of the parts of the argument Rawls ultimately found to be wanting, the flaws Rawls discovered there, and the ways that the pieces of the later work serve to fix those problems. ... Weithman's reconstruction of both the original argument in A Theory of Justice and the later, political, replacement, are masterpieces of close, almost scholastic, exegesis. * Anthony Simon Laden, Mind * Read more...

